Comparative Evidence, Not a Foreign Template
The PRAUSA Plan is tailored to the United States, the OASI financing structure, American labor markets, and the requirement that existing commitments be honored without federal borrowing or general-revenue financing.
No foreign system provides a ready-made model. International experience is useful because it shows what large funded systems can accomplish, where they have encountered difficulty, and which design choices deserve particular attention in a U.S. system.
International Systems
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Australia
— Superannuation Guarantee
Australia requires employers to contribute 12 percent of eligible earnings to superannuation funds for workers. The system has accumulated substantial funded assets managed through private and industry funds, with worker accounts invested across capital markets.
Australia demonstrates that compulsory funded retirement saving can operate across an entire national workforce. Its experience also highlights the importance of low-cost defaults, fee discipline, consolidation, clear disclosure, and effective treatment of inactive or duplicate accounts.
Sweden
— Premium Pension Within a Broader Public System
Sweden directs 18.5 percent of pensionable income to its national public pension structure. Of that amount, 2.5 percentage points fund the Premium Pension, a funded investment-account tier with participant fund choice and a government-run default option, while the larger income-pension component remains notional.
Sweden demonstrates that a funded investment-account component can operate within a national retirement system and alongside a notional pension tier. It also illustrates why funded assets and notional claims must remain clearly distinguished.
Singapore
— Central Provident Fund
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund is a compulsory savings system. For employees age 55 and younger at the standard fully phased-in rate, combined employer and employee contributions total 37 percent of wages in 2026, subject to applicable wage ceilings and contribution rules. The accounts serve retirement, housing, and healthcare purposes rather than retirement alone.
Singapore demonstrates long-term administrative capacity and the accumulation of large individual balances. Its 37 percent contribution rate is not a retirement-only benchmark because the CPF finances several major social-policy functions in addition to retirement.
Hong Kong
— Mandatory Provident Fund
Hong Kong’s Mandatory Provident Fund generally requires employers and employees each to contribute 5 percent of relevant income, subject to statutory minimum and maximum income levels. Assets are held in individual accounts and managed by approved trustees and investment funds.
Hong Kong demonstrates that individually held retirement accounts can coexist with private administration and standardized regulation. Its experience also underscores the importance of fee control, simple defaults, transparent comparisons, and administrative efficiency.
Chile
— Individual Accounts in a Reformed Mixed System
Chile established mandatory individual retirement accounts in 1981 and developed one of the world’s longest-running national account systems. A 2025 reform retained individual capitalization accounts while adding phased employer contributions and a stronger social-insurance component intended to improve adequacy and address coverage and gender disparities.
Chile shows both the durability and the limits of account ownership by itself. Contribution density, labor-market coverage, fees, payout design, and distributional concerns materially affect retirement outcomes and the political durability of the system.
Mexico
— AFORE Individual Accounts
Mexico shifted private-sector workers entering the reformed system to mandatory individual accounts administered by AFORE retirement-fund managers. Under the current reform path, mandatory retirement contributions are being increased progressively toward approximately 15 percent by 2030,with the exact rate depending onearnings and statutory components.
Mexico demonstrates that funded individual accounts can provide transparent accumulation and ownership, while also showing how low contribution rates, incomplete formal-sector coverage, and interrupted contribution histories can weaken retirement adequacy.
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Sources
Sources reviewed August 2026: Australian Taxation Office; Swedish pension authorities; Singapore Central Provident Fund Board; Hong Kong Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority; Chilean pension authorities; OECD pension publications; U.S. Social Security Administration; Alaska Division of Retirement and Benefits.
Related U.S. Experience
Texas County Alternative Plans
Galveston, Brazoria, and Matagorda Counties established retirement arrangements outside Social Security before federal law closed that opt-out path. Their plans use individual-account-based, privately administered arrangements with guaranteed-interest features.
These plans are limited comparators rather than national models. They demonstrate that payroll-based alternatives can be administered in the United States, while also highlighting the importance of outcomes for low earners, intermittent workers, survivors, and inflation protection.
Alaska Public Employees and Teachers
Alaska’s newer Public Employees’ and Teachers’ Retirement System tiers use participant-directed defined-contribution plans with employee and employer contributions, investment options, vesting, beneficiary rights, and related death, disability, medical, and health-reimbursement features.
Alaska demonstrates the administrative transparency and portability of funded defined-contribution accounts, while also showing that accumulation is only one part of retirement design. Lifetime-income adequacy, disability, retiree healthcare, and payout rules remain separate policy questions.
What International Experience Establishes
Large funded retirement systems can be administered across national workforces.
Funded balances can be invested, portable, inheritable, and reported transparently when the legal structure provides those rights.
Contribution rates are not directly comparable across countries without examining wage ceilings, government supplements, housing or healthcare functions, and other policy layers.
Fees, default investments, coverage, and contribution continuity materially affect retirement outcomes.
Account accumulation must be paired with sound retirement-income, survivor, disability, and longevity rules.
No foreign example establishes whether the PRAUSA transition satisfies its no-borrowing, benefit-continuity, reserve, adequacy, and closure requirements. Those questions require independent U.S. actuarial scoring.
International experience establishes that funded retirement systems are operationally feasible at large scale. It does not establish that every funded system is well designed, nor does it determine the correct U.S. contribution rate or transition structure.
The relevant evidence is practical: ownership rules, contribution design, investment defaults, fees, coverage, and payout rules all matter.
Personal Retirement Accounts Internationally
What Other Funded Systems Demonstrate—and What They Do Not
Funded retirement accounts are not an untested concept. National systems in several countries have accumulated funded retirement assets for decades. Their experience establishes that large funded systems can operate at national scale while also showing that contribution design, coverage, fees, defaults, retirement-income rules, and governance determine results.